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Abstract 
The experience sampling method (ESM) is often used in research, and promoted for clinical use, 
with the rationale that it avoids problematic inaccuracies and biases that attend retrospective 
measures of mental phenomena. Research suggests that averaged scores from ESM data are more 
accurate than retrospective ratings. However, it is not known how well individuals can remember 
information about momentary (rather than averaged) mental states, nor how accurately they 
estimate the dynamic covariation of these states. Individual differences in retrospective accuracy 
are also poorly understood. In two pre-registered studies, we examined differences between 
retrospective memory for stress and self-esteem and data gathered via experience sampling and 
examined whether alexithymia predicted accuracy. Results of both studies revealed substantial 
discrepancies between retrospective ratings and ESM ratings, especially for momentary states 
and their covariation. Alexithymia was positively related to recognition of stress means and 
variability but unrelated to recall of either stress or self-esteem, their variability, or their 
covariation. These findings suggest that experience sampling may be more useful than self-report 
when precise information is needed about the timing of mental states and dynamics among them.   
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 For Whom, and For What, Is Experience Sampling More Accurate than Retrospective 
Report? 
The experience sampling method (ESM), also known as ambulatory assessment or 
ecological momentary assessment, is an increasingly popular way to gather data from individuals 
in their everyday lives. Scholars have suggested that ESM has the potential to enhance basic 
psychological research (Miller, 2012), knowledge of psychopathology (Trull & Ebner-Priemer, 
2013), and clinical psychological practice (van Os et al., 2017). Indeed, ESM offers a number of 
potential advantages over retrospective assessment of mental states and behaviors, such as the 
ability to collect timestamped, contextualized data and the ability to construct person-specific, 
dynamic portraits of an individual’s functioning (Fisher & Boswell, 2016; Shiffman, Stone, & 
Hufford, 2008).  
Perhaps the most straightforward benefit of ESM is that real-time assessment minimizes 
the inaccuracy and bias that attend retrospective reports of mental states. Several studies 
comparing ESM and retrospective measures suggest that memory for past mental states is 
flawed, a phenomenon known as the “memory-experience gap.” Most commonly, a negative 
memory bias is found wherein the individual tends to recall more intense or persistent negative 
experiences than they reported at the time (Ben-Zeev & Young, 2010; Gloster et al., 2008; Kelly, 
Kertz, Simpson, Bloch, & Pittenger, 2019; Urban et al., 2018; but see Mneimne et al., in press). 
Some studies suggest that this negativity bias may be a component of a more general extremity 
bias, in which individuals remember positive experiences as more positive, and negative 
experiences as more negative, than actually experienced (Ben-Zeev, McHugo, Xie, Dobbins, & 
Young, 2012; Ben-Zeev, Young, & Madsen, 2009; Neubauer, Scott, Sliwinski, & Smyth, in 
press; Wenze, Gunthert, & German, 2012). Even so, there is evidence that this bias is larger for 
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negative than for positive experiences (Miron-Shatz, 2009; Ganzach & Yaor, 2019). In general, 
these studies suggest that averaged experience sampling data provides a more accurate picture of 
a person’s actual thoughts, feelings, and behaviors than relying on retrospective summaries of 
these experiences.  
However, far less research has accumulated regarding the potential benefits of experience 
sampling for momentary or disaggregated information – that is, momentary states and 
experiences, rather than averages. Some studies do suggest that retrospective ratings of means 
and general frequencies are less prone to inaccuracy than estimates of change and instability 
(Ebner-Priemer, Bohus, & Kuo, 2007, as cited in Ebner-Priemer & Trull, 2009; Stone, 
Broderick, Shiffman, & Schwartz, 2004). However, these estimates are themselves averages of 
instability over time and do not directly deal with the timing and sequences of momentary mental 
experiences. Likewise, some studies suggest that individuals may overestimate how much 
different mental and behavioral phenomena covary (that is, go together in time) for them 
(Gloster, Meyer, Witthauer, Lieb, & Mata, 2017; Gloster et al., 2008; Shiffman et al., 1997). 
However, in general, comparisons between retrospectively assessed and contemporaneously 
assessed momentary information are few. This is true even though experience sampling is 
naturally suited to capturing rich momentary data, including not only time-varying psychological 
phenomena but also their timing, context, and temporal sequence. Indeed, the extent to which 
retrospective self-report is reliable for these aspects of momentary experience would be of great 
interest to personality researchers interested in within-person processes (Fleeson & 
Jayawickreme, 2015; Revelle & Condon, 2015; Vallacher, Read, & Nowak, 2002), as well as to 
clinicians who work with clients to identify triggers or concomitants of momentary negative 
thoughts and acute dysphoria.  
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In addition, there is little research on individual differences that may affect the memory-
experience gap. Older individuals may show less distorted recall of aggregated affect ratings 
(Neubauer, Scott, Sliwinski, & Smyth, in press). Neuroticism, as well as components of 
neuroticism such as depressivity and anxiousness, may also influence the degree to which 
individuals overestimate how much negative emotion they rated via experience sampling, in 
aggregate (Barrett, 1997; Ben-Zeev & Young, 2010; Cutler, Larsen, & Bunce, 1996; Larsen, 
1992; Safer, Levine, & Drapalski, 2002; Suls & Howren, 2012). Beyond these specific individual 
differences, which only pertain to averaged data, little is known about individual differences in 
the memory-experience gap, and to our knowledge no study has investigated individual 
differences in memory for momentary (disaggregated) mental states or experiences. 
One individual difference that plausibly may influence the utility of ESM in mitigating 
distorted memory is alexithymia. This is a dimensionally distributed trait (Keefer, Taylor, Parker, 
& Bagby, 2019; Mattila et al., 2010; Parker, Keefer, Taylor, & Bagby, 2008) that describes the 
degree to which an individual finds it difficult to identify and describe their own emotional 
experience, shows limited emotional imagination, and has a cognitive style focused on external 
events rather than internal states (Taylor & Bagby, 2012). Alexithymia shows correlations with 
many different deficits in processing emotional information, especially deficits in automatic 
processing of negative emotions (Donges & Suslow, 2017). Moreover, some recent evidence 
also suggests that alexithymia’s processing deficits extend to non-affective internal states as 
well, such as sensation and cognition. Alexithymia relates, for example, to discrepancies between 
implicit and explicit self-esteem (Dentale, San Martini, De Coro, & Pomponio, 2010) and to poor 
awareness of bodily sensations (Murphy, Brewer, Hobson, Catmur, & Bird, 2018). It may be the 
case, therefore, that alexithymia relates to the extent to which individuals process their ongoing 
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internal experiences, both affective and non-affective, and can remember them later. Indeed, 
many studies suggest that individuals high in this trait have a general deficit in explicit memory 
for emotional information (Luminet et al., 2006; Meltzer & Nielson, 2010; Suslow, Kersting, & 
Arolt, 2003; Vermeulen & Luminet, 2009; for a review of this literature, see Apgáua & Jaeger, 
2019). Therefore, it is possible that alexithymia may relate to the extent to which ESM improves 
upon retrospective self-report. However, existing studies have mainly used laboratory-based 
designs in which self-reported emotions or sensations are captured contemporaneously with 
objective stimuli or after a short delay (e.g., one hour). This limits the direct relevance of these 
findings for the utility of ESM in populations both high and low in alexithymia, because 
experience sampling’s mnemonic benefits extend primarily to mental states and events that have 
occurred at a greater hiatus (e.g., one week). Research also suggests that the timing of 
alexithymia’s effects on memory is important (Muir, Madill, & Brown, 2017). Thus, the specific 
impact of alexithymia for events that might be captured by experience sampling, instead of self-
reported after the amount of time that might elapse in an outpatient clinical context, is not well 
understood. 
The current series of studies aims to fill these gaps in the literature by investigating the 
memory-experience gap for stress and self-esteem states, in both averaged and disaggregated 
form, with a one-week gap between ESM ratings and retrospective ones. In both studies, 
alexithymia is examined as a correlate of accuracy. In the first study, participants completed 
ratings of stress and self-esteem states 64 times over the course of two days before completing 
recognition tasks for the averages, changes (timing and magnitude), and dynamic covariances of 
these states approximately one week later. Study 2 aimed to replicate this design, using recall-
based memory tasks instead of recognition. 
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Study 1 
The first aim of study 1 was to investigate the extent of the memory-experience gap for 
momentary stress and self-esteem states, including both aggregated information (average stress 
and self-esteem) and disaggregated information (moment-by-moment stress and self-esteem 
states, and dynamic covariance of stress and self-esteem). The second aim was to investigate the 
relationship of trait alexithymia to the discrepancy between these variables rated in an 
experience-sampling protocol and retrospectively assessed values. We hypothesized that 
alexithymia would exacerbate the memory-experience gap for stress and self-esteem. The study 
protocol and hypotheses were pre-registered at https://osf.io/ympu6, and study materials and data 
are also available at the same repository. 
Method 
Participants and procedure. Participants were recruited randomly, via email, from 
introductory psychology classes at a small university in the Southwestern U.S. Individual 
participants attended an initial laboratory visit to complete a demographics questionnaire, receive 
instructions for completing surveys on their smartphones, and pick a schedule for ESM survey 
completion. They also completed the Toronto Alexithymia Scale-20 (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & 
Taylor, 1994), a twenty-item self-report measure of alexithymia, at this visit. The TAS-20 is the 
most frequently used measure of alexithymia and contains three subscales related to difficulty 
identifying feelings, difficulty describing feelings, and externally-oriented thinking. Items are 
rated on a 5-point scale. The internal consistency of the TAS-20 in Study 1 was adequate (α = 
.81).  
Experience sampling. For the ESM portion of the study, participants completed a survey 
on 64 occasions using the web browser of their smartphone and Qualtrics online survey software. 
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A timer application provided auditory prompts for survey completion. Participants were 
prompted to complete surveys every 15 minutes for eight hours, and this series of 32 surveys was 
then repeated on a second day. Participants could choose when to start surveys, but they were 
asked to complete survey series on days when they would be able to do so faithfully. Each 
survey consisted of two questions, which were rated on a visual analog scale using a sliding 
response bar and the phone’s touchscreen. Self-esteem was measured with the prompt, “Right 
now, I feel good about myself.” Stress was measured with the prompt, “Right now, I feel 
stressed.” Responses were coded using a 0-100 scale with anchors at 0 (“Not at all”) and 100 
(“Extremely”). 
After each participant completed these surveys, their 64-occasion dataset was compiled 
and processed. First, their mean levels of stress and self-esteem were computed. Second, 
graphical displays (time plots) of their unique stress and self-esteem time series were created. 
Finally, dynamic factor models were created for each participant, using LISREL, version 8.12 
(Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993), to represent the covariation of stress and self-esteem in 
contemporaneous ratings and across fifteen-minute intervals. An autoregressive model with a lag 
of one occasion, in which each variable was regressed on itself at the prior occasion and allowed 
to correlate with the other variable at the same occasion, was used as the baseline model for each 
participant. If this model did not show a good fit to the data, modification indices guided the 
addition of cross-lagged regression parameters between one variable at time t – 1 and another 
variable at time t until satisfactory fit was achieved. Only lag-1 parameters were permitted in 
these models. Thus, five parameters were possible: the two autoregressive parameters, the two 
cross-lagged regression parameters, and the contemporaneous correlation between the two 
variables. Fit decisions were based on cutoffs (Hu & Bentler, 1999) on the Standardized Root 
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Mean Square Residual (SRMR; value ≤ 0.1), the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA; value ≤ 0.08), the Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI; value ≥ 0.95), and the Comparative 
Fit Index (CFI; value ≥ 0.95). 
As an additional pre-processing step before these models were created, cubic spline 
interpolation (Forsythe, Malcolm, & Moler, 1977) with the “spline” function in R software was 
used to create equal intervals between measurement occasions for each person. This is a 
requirement of dynamic factor analysis (Molenaar & Rovine, 2011). Cubic spline interpolation 
fits curves to the observed time series (separately for each variable, day, and individual) and then 
re-samples from the curves to create time series with equal intervals between observations. In a 
previous paper using experience sampling, cubic spline interpolation produced model parameters 
that closely corresponded to those describing the original data (Fisher, Reeves, Lawyer, 
Medaglia, & Rubel, 2017). 
Memory tasks. Participants were asked to return to the lab for a second in-person session 
approximately one week after completing ESM surveys. They were not told the purpose of this 
session, except that they would answer some questions about their experience completing mobile 
surveys. On average, this second session occurred 6.64 days (SD = 3.92) after completion of 
ESM surveys. During the second session, participants were first asked to recall the average level 
of their stress and self-esteem during the ESM sampling period, on the same 0-100 scale. Then, 
they were asked to recognize their stress means from among four numbers: their mean and those 
of three other participants (typically the previous three participants). We used other participants’ 
means in order to provide a realistic set of alternatives for this task. Participants then did the 
same task for self-esteem. All means were rounded to the nearest tenth of a point. Third, 
participants were shown four 64-occasion time plots of stress on an 8.5in. x 11in. piece of paper, 
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one of which was theirs and the other three of which were other participants’ stress time plots. 
Participants were reminded of the timing of their surveys and asked to recognize their own stress 
variation over this time period. This task was also repeated for self-esteem. Finally, participants 
were shown graphical representations of four dynamic factor models, which represented the 
longitudinal covariation of stress and self-esteem for themselves (that is, their good-fitting 
model) and three other models, chosen randomly from among the 30 other possible models 
(Figure 1). The meaning of the model parameters was explained in detail by a research assistant, 
who verified each participant’s understanding by asking them to explain the parameters back. 
After participants demonstrated understanding of these models, they were asked to choose their 
own pattern of dynamic covariation from the alternatives. 
Seventy-five individuals (Mage = 18.6, age range = 18 to 22) enrolled in the study. Of 
these participants, 50 (66.7%) reported their gender as female and 25 (33.3%) as male. Five 
participants (6.7%) reported their race as Black, none as Native American, twelve (16.0%) as 
Asian, fifty-five (73.3%) as White, and three (4.0%) as multiracial (participants could choose 
more than one racial category). Twelve participants (19.5%) reported their ethnicity as 
Hispanic/Latinx. Of the 75 enrolled participants, 13 did not complete both eight-hour survey 
blocks, and two additional participants did not attend the second lab session. The remaining 60 
participants, which was the intended sample size at pre-registration, constituted the sample for 
Study 1. None of the measured demographic variables (age, gender, race, or ethnicity) related to 
attrition between enrollment and completion of the second lab session (p-values > .30).  
Results and Discussion 
Compliance with ESM Protocol and Variability of Responses 
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 Participants were generally compliant with the ESM protocol. They completed an 
average of 60.13 (SD = 5.21), or 94.0%, of the 64 prompted surveys, with a median of 62 
surveys completed. In addition, it is important to examine the variability in the data, as the 
current analyses hinge on memory for both stress and self-esteem means (which vary from 
individual to individual) and for within-person variability in these variables over time. 
Specifically, we calculated the between-person standard deviations, the within-person standard 
deviations, and the root mean square successive differences (RMSSD; e.g., Jahng, Wood, & 
Trull, 2008) of each variable. The last of these statistics is particularly important for time-series 
data, as it indexes how variables change over successive surveys (here, over 15 minutes). Stress 
(SDbetween = 18.15, SDwithin = 15.49, RMSSD = 13.90) and self-esteem (SDbetween = 15.36, SDwithin 
= 13.23, RMSSD = 13.76) both showed comparable within-subject and between-subject standard 
deviations and RMSSD values.1 This suggests that the memory tasks, in which participants 
attempted to distinguish their data from others’ data, were based on adequate between-person 
and within-person variability. 
Memory Performance and Alexithymia 
On average, participants displayed a bias towards recalling more stress (M = 41.35, SD = 
23.07) than they rated in ESM surveys (M = 34.20, SD = 20.74), t(59) = 5.53, p < .001, d = .33. 
However, their retrospective recall of self-esteem (M = 66.05, SD = 18.26) was not significantly 
biased with respect to ESM ratings (M = 65.41, SD = 16.63), t(59) = .656, p = .52, d = .04. In 
recognition tasks, 34 participants (56.7%) correctly recognized their stress mean from among 
alternatives, which was better than chance, χ2(1) = 30.4, p < .001. Forty participants (66.7%) 
                                                 
1 In response to a comment by an anonymous reviewer, we will note that the ratios of the between-person and 
within-person variances do not exceed the ratio of 1.5:1, which is cited by Rosopa, Schaffer, & Schroeder (2013) as 
an indication of heterogeneity of variance. 
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correctly recognized their self-esteem mean, 40 participants (66.7%) recognized their stress time 
plot, and 40 (66.7%) recognized their self-esteem time plot (for each of these three tasks, χ2[1] = 
53.4, p < .001). In contrast, they performed at chance levels when asked to recognize how self-
esteem and stress covaried during the time they were completing ESM surveys: only 14 
individuals (23.3%) correctly recognized their own model of covariation from among 
alternatives, χ2(1) = 0.03, p =.86.  
Contrary to hypotheses, participants higher in alexithymia correctly recognized their 
stress level from among alternatives more often, OR = 3.63, p = .02, and also recognized their 
stress time plot from among alternatives more often, OR = 3.95, p = .02, than those with lower 
levels of alexithymia (Figure 2). That is, for every unit increase in alexithymia on the 5-point 
scale with which it was measured, participants’ odds of correctly picking their stress level and 
time plot more than tripled, on average. However, alexithymia did not predict recognition of self-
esteem level, OR = .798, p = .67, or self-esteem time plot, OR = 2.12, p = .18. Finally, 
alexithymia did not predict individuals’ recognition of their patterns of covariance between stress 
and self-esteem, OR = .856, p = .79.  
Thus, in general results showed a negative recall bias for stress, but not self-esteem, 
consistent with the literature on the memory-experience gap for aggregated negative emotional 
experiences (e.g., Ben-Zeev & Young, 2010). Also consistent with this literature, recognition of 
self-esteem means was slightly better than recognition of stress means; nevertheless, participants 
were usually able to recognize both their average stress level and average self-esteem level from 
among alternatives. Memory for disaggregated stress and self-esteem levels, as measured 
through recognition tests of stress and self-esteem time plots from among alternatives, was also 
fair. This suggests that individuals encode and remember a degree of information about their 
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momentary stress and self-esteem states that can sometimes enable them to recognize their own 
unique fluctuations in these experiences. However, recognition of the dynamic covariation of 
stress and self-esteem (including how self-esteem and stress states are linked to one another and 
to themselves across 15-minute intervals) was poor. This finding is consistent with prior studies 
suggesting systematic discrepancies between the actual within-person covariance of different 
states and events and individuals’ estimation of this covariance (Gloster, et al., 2017; Gloster et 
al., 2008). The current results suggest that individuals do not perceive and encode these 
dynamics accurately, giving the experience sampling method (along with within-person 
analyses) a clear advantage when it comes to uncovering the actual dynamic processes among 
different mental states, events, and behaviors.  
It was particularly unexpected that alexithymia would relate positively to individuals’ 
recognition of their stress means and time plots. One possible explanation for this pattern is that 
individuals high in alexithymia may have distinctive patterns of stress (for example, different 
levels or patterns of variability) that may have aided their recognition of these configurations 
from among alternatives, whereas individuals low in alexithymia may have been unable to 
distinguish their stress levels and fluctuations from others’. If so, we would expect that this 
memory advantage for alexithymia would not extend to recall, where there would be no visual 
cues to help individuals discriminate their experiences from others’ in this way. We tested this 
possibility in a second study, which replicated Study 1 but used only recall-based measures. 
Study 2 
The results of Study 1 suggested that individuals high in alexithymia more accurately 
recognized the mean levels and variability in their stress over time. This finding was opposite of 
what we hypothesized. We reasoned that this surprising effect may have been due to the 
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recognition-based nature of the memory tasks used in this study. If people high in alexithymia 
had distinctive stress patterns compared to those with more moderate levels of alexithymia, this 
may have strengthened their ability to recognize these patterns from among alternatives. If so, we 
reasoned that their relative advantage would not extend to recall-based tasks (Vermeulen & 
Luminet, 2009). Thus, Study 2 was intended as a replication of Study 1, using only recall-based 
measures. Like Study 1, the design and hypotheses of Study 2 were preregistered at 
https://osf.io/ympu6, where study materials and data are also publicly available.  
Method 
 Participants and procedure. Participants were undergraduate students from the same 
university as in Study 1, and the recruitment method was identical to that of Study 1. Eighty-
seven individuals (Mage = 18.5, range = 18 to 21 years) enrolled in the study. Of these, 55 
(63.2%) were female and 30 (34.5%) were male. Two participants declined to select a gender. 
Six participants (6.9%) reported their race as Black, one (1.1%) as Native American, eleven 
(12.6%) as Asian, sixty-six (75.9%) as White, and five (5.7%) as multiracial. Seventeen 
participants (19.5%) reported their ethnicity as Hispanic/Latinx. Of the 87 participants who 
enrolled in the study, 12 (13.8%) did not complete the protocol: 10 did not complete ESM 
surveys, one did surveys but did not attend the second laboratory session, and one participant 
provided ESM with insufficient variability to be used in the recall procedures. Thus, the final 
sample consisted of 75 individuals, which was the pre-registered sample size. As in Study 1, all 
measured demographic variables were unrelated to completion of the study (p-values > .64).  
 As in Study 1, participants attended an initial lab session, where they completed a 
demographic questionnaire and the TAS-20. The internal consistency of the TAS-20 in Study 2 
was α = .85. Thereafter, participants completed 64 surveys measuring their momentary stress and 
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self-esteem before returning to the lab an average of 7.27 days later (SD = 5.66). In this second 
lab session, memory tasks consisted exclusively of recall-based measures. First, participants 
were asked to recall their average levels of stress and self-esteem during the ESM surveys on a 
0-100 scale.  
Time plot (recall). Next, participants were given a tablet computer (a Microsoft Surface 
Pro) on which a 7 in. x 5 in. (17.5 cm x 13.0 cm) rectangular field was displayed. The left side of 
this field was labeled as a y-axis from 0 to 100. Participants were reminded of the times of the 
start and end of their first day of surveys and were asked to use the tablet’s stylus to trace their 
memory of stress (or self-esteem) within the field, on the 0-100 scale, from the beginning of their 
surveys to the end for that day. They then repeated this procedure for the second day of surveys 
and then again for the second variable (the order in which stress and self-esteem recall was 
measured was randomized). Their traced time plots were then laid over their actual time plots on 
an identically sized grid, and the inaccuracy in their recall was quantified as the area between the 
two lines, in pixels. The two days’ pixel counts for stress were then added together to create an 
overall measure of stress recall inaccuracy; the same was done for self-esteem. These time plots 
also allowed us to quantify recall bias in average stress and self-esteem in a second way, by 
comparing the error pixels above their traced plots (underestimation) with the error pixels below 
(overestimation). 
Dynamic covariation (recall). Each individual’s bivariate time series was subjected to 
dynamic factor analysis using the same procedure as Study 1. In the final recall task of the lab 
visit, a research assistant explained the concept of covariation of stress and self-esteem to 
participants in basic terms, including the contemporaneous and lagged relationships that appear 
in these models. This explanation was accompanied by a graphical display (a path diagram 
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without arrows) representing stress and self-esteem at one survey and at the next. Participants 
were asked to complete the diagram by drawing arrows to represent what they recalled about the 
covariation between their stress and self-esteem levels during their ESM survey period. Because 
there were four variables in the model (stress and self-esteem, each at one occasion and the 
following occasion), five arrows were possible: the contemporaneous, undirected connection 
between stress and self-esteem; the lagged, autoregressive relationships between stress or self-
esteem at one survey and the same variable at the next survey; and the cross-lagged regression 
relationships, in which stress or self-esteem predicted the other variable at the following survey 
(Figure 1). After participants had done this, research assistants verified their understanding of the 
meaning of each parameter by asking the participants to explain them, and any errors in 
understanding were corrected as needed. After the task was completed, a model consisting of the 
parameters each participant entered was fit to their actual data. The Standardized Root Mean 
Square Residual (SRMR) for this model was used to operationalize inaccuracy, as it provides a 
quantitative index of the degree of model misfit (Maydeu Olivares, 2017). Because the SRMR 
does not penalize models for overparameterization, participants were instructed to draw the same 
number of arrows as were needed to achieve adequate fit to their actual data, according to 
dynamic factor models derived as in Study 1. 
Results and Discussion 
Compliance with ESM Protocol and Variability of Responses 
 As in Study 1, compliance with the ESM protocol was generally good. Participants 
completed an average of 61.56 (SD = 3.28), or 96.2%, of the 64 prompted surveys, with a 
median of 63 surveys completed. Variability of stress and self-esteem was also adequate, both 
between individuals and within individuals over a 15-minute interval for both stress (SDbetween = 
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18.15, SDwithin = 17.12, RMSSD = 15.47) and self-esteem (SDbetween = 15.36, SDwithin = 13.23, 
RMSSD = 13.41). 
Memory Performance and Alexithymia 
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the three measures of recall inaccuracy (the 
difference between participants’ recalled means and their means from ESM surveys, the 
difference between participants’ drawings of their stress and self-esteem over time from time 
plots constructed from ESM data, and the misfit of participants’ covariance models when applied 
to their ESM data), as well as correlations among these indices of inaccuracy. As in Study 1, 
participants showed a recall bias for stress, recalling higher average stress (M = 46.95, SD = 
21.60) than they reported in experience sampling surveys (M = 37.82, SD = 18.24), t(74) = 6.30, 
p < .001, d = .46, 95% CI: 6.25 to 12.03. In contrast to Study 1, participants also recalled 
significantly lower self-esteem averages (M = 64.33, SD = 18.04) than they reported during the 
experience sampling period (M = 66.36, SD = 15.63), t(74) = 2.20, p = .03, d = .12, 95% CI: -
3.87 to -0.19. For comparison, the intraindividual (within-subject) standard deviations for ESM 
ratings were 17.29 for stress and 13.53 for self-esteem, on average. This means that individuals’ 
ratings were accurate to within 0.52 SD for stress and 0.15 SD for self-esteem. Thus, consistent 
with Study 1, individuals were more accurate for self-esteem than for stress.  
Figure 3 shows the time-plot drawings for the first eight participants (all of these 
drawings are available at https://osf.io/ympu6). These drawings also revealed a bias in recalled 
stress, such that participants overestimated their stress by an average net count (counted as the 
pixels of overestimation minus the pixels of underestimation) of 137,397 pixels (SD = 71,234), 
t(70) = 4.12, p < .001, d = 1.93, 95% CI: 71,224 to 204,651. However, this bias was not 
statistically significant for the self-esteem time-plot drawings, where participants were generally 
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accurate in the levels of their self-esteem relative to their ESM data (M = 13,685 pixels of 
underestimation, SD = 220,731), t(70) = .522, p = .60, d = .06, 95% CI: -65,932 to 38,561. 
Roughly 29% of the area of the stress time-plot drawings consisted of error, whereas this figure 
was only 18% for self-esteem time-plot drawings.  
Participants were generally not accurate in estimating the longitudinal covariance of their 
stress and self-esteem, with a median SRMR of 0.15. Indeed, fully 75% of the sample had an 
SRMR that exceeded 0.08, a widely used guideline for good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
Comparison of the parameters chosen by participants to parameters appearing in participants’ 
dynamic factor models (Table 2) revealed a systematic bias: participants often underestimated 
the “inertia” of their stress, rarely recalling that their momentary stress levels tended to relate to 
their stress levels 15 minutes before. The same was true for self-esteem. In contrast, they 
overestimated the frequency with which stress would predict self-esteem, and self-esteem would 
predict stress, over this same time interval. Thus, they tended to overestimate the dynamic, 
lagged links between these two experiences.  
 Alexithymia. Participants’ level of alexithymia as measured by the TAS-20 did not relate 
to any of the measures of recall inaccuracy. TAS-20 scores were unrelated to inaccuracy in recall 
of stress means, rs = -.06, p = .61, self-esteem means, rs = -.05, p = .65, stress time plots, rs = .04, 
p = .76, self-esteem time plots, rs = .12, p = .32, and dynamic covariation of stress and self-
esteem, rs = .05, p = .65. Exploratory analyses relating TAS-20 subscales to these outcomes did 
suggest that the externally oriented thinking subscale related negatively to inaccuracy in recall of 
stress means, rs = -.289, p = .012. That is, the higher these scores were, the more accurate 
individuals were in recalling how stressed they were during the ESM sampling period, on 
average. Otherwise, none of the TAS-20 subscales were significantly related to any index of 
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recall inaccuracy. In general, these results are consistent with those of Study 1 in suggesting that 
high levels of alexithymia do not exacerbate the memory-experience gap; in fact, Study 2 
provided some limited evidence that a facet of alexithymia might decrease the memory-
experience gap for stress, but not self-esteem. 
General Discussion 
 The current two studies allow us to quantify the degree to which ESM may be more 
accurate than retrospective self-report for momentary (disaggregated) psychological data. 
Participants recognized time plots of their momentary stress and self-esteem data only two-thirds 
of the time, and roughly 20-30% of the area of participants’ drawings of these time plots was 
“error.” Although this degree of inaccuracy does not indicate an absolute advantage for ESM 
over self-report, it does suggest that in applications where having information about the exact 
timing of mental states is important, retrospective memory for momentary mental states may not 
suffice. Timestamped ESM data may be necessary to ensure that that the recovered patterns are 
accurate. ESM could thus be particularly useful in studies aimed at uncovering within-person 
processes related to individual differences in personality, as well as in clinical applications where 
knowledge of both the timing and severity of mental states is essential.  
 Across two studies, participants displayed a recall bias for stress, exemplified by 
overestimated stress means in both studies and overestimation of stress in time plot drawings in 
study 2. This finding is in line with prior research showing a tendency for individuals to recall 
more negative affect than they reported in real time (Ben-Zeev & Young, 2010; Gloster et al., 
2008; Kelly, Kertz, Simpson, Bloch, & Pittenger, 2019; Urban et al., 2018). Somewhat less 
robust was the recall bias for self-esteem, which was small in size and confined only to study 2. 
Nonetheless, these findings echo the moderate body of research suggesting particular benefits for 
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aggregated experience sampling data over retrospectively recalled experiences, especially 
negative ones. Prior research suggests that the size of this bias may depend on the gap between 
events and recall (the “fading affect bias”; e.g., Gibbons, Lee, & Walker, 2011). Thus, the 
current study may provide a useful benchmark for the degree to which ESM holds benefits over 
self-report for aggregated data in some clinically common applications, such as outpatient 
therapy (where the gap between events and recall often approximates one week).  
 Memory for how stress and self-esteem covaried over time was poor. Results suggested 
that participants were merely guessing when asked to recognize these patterns, and that most 
participants in study 2 did not recall these dynamics with good fidelity, as measured by the 
median “fit” of the models they chose to describe their own data. Thus, these results imply a 
consistent advantage for experience sampling over retrospective report for information about 
dynamic relationships among mental states. This is in line with prior research suggesting that 
retrospective ratings of means and general frequencies are less prone to inaccuracy than 
information about change and instability (Ebner-Priemer, Bohus, & Kuo, 2007, as cited in 
Ebner-Priemer & Trull, 2009; Stone, Broderick, Shiffman, & Schwartz, 2004). This finding also 
echoes research suggesting disagreements between the actual covariance of events and mental 
states and individuals’ estimates of this covariation (Gloster, Meyer, Witthauer, Lieb, & Mata, 
2017; Gloster et al., 2008; Shiffman et al., 1997). That participants were not only inaccurate in 
the current study but also biased (in the sense that they recalled more lagged, dynamic relations 
between stress and self-esteem and underestimated the inertia in these two states) suggests that 
this inaccuracy may reflect participants’ intuitive or folk-psychological theories of how stress 
and self-esteem are related. Whatever the source of this inaccuracy, however, the current results 
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strongly suggest that if researchers or clinicians want access to accurate information on the 
dynamic relationships between mental states, ESM is very likely to outperform self-report. 
 Our general hypothesis that alexithymia would relate positively to memory inaccuracy 
for stress and self-esteem was not supported. In fact, alexithymia related positively to recognition 
of stress levels and stress variation, and the specific alexithymia facet of externally oriented 
thinking related positively to recall of stress levels. One potential explanation for this finding, as 
above, is that individuals high in alexithymia may have distinctive levels of stress and patterns of 
stress reactivity, which may be easier to recognize. This interpretation is supported by the 
weakening of this effect when recall tasks were employed to measure memory. Another 
possibility is that high levels of alexithymia may involve a greater attunement to certain aspects 
of moment-to-moment stress experiences. Alexithymia is related to an attentional focus on 
external events rather than internal ones (Zimmermann et al., 2005) and a tendency toward an 
external locus of control (Hexel, 2003; Hungr, Ogrodniczuk, & Sochting, 2016; Verissimo, 
Taylor, & Bagby, 2000). As a result, it may be that individuals high in alexithymia are more 
prone to attend to and encode information about stressors than those low in alexithymia and may 
use this information in recognizing their stress level, leading to a relative advantage. This 
supposition is supported by the advantage in recall of stress that was related specifically to the 
externally oriented thinking subscale in Study 2. If this is true, it may also help explain why the 
apparent memory advantage for those high in alexithymia did not extend to self-esteem, which 
may not track external events as closely. Further research will be needed to confirm these 
speculative hypotheses, however.  
 The current study has several limitations that deserve mention. One such limitation is that 
our sample consisted of university students, which may in some ways be unrepresentative of the 
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general population, as well as the population of individuals involved in outpatient therapy. For 
example, one potential reason that alexithymia did not negatively impact memory for stress or 
self-esteem is that the general level of alexithymia in our sample may not have been above the 
threshold required for these effects to be exhibited. Thus, further research will be needed to 
explore the extent to which the current results generalize to other groups. A second limitation is 
that stress and self-esteem were each assessed with only one item in ESM surveys. This raises 
the possibility that some amount of the discrepancy between individuals’ true momentary stress 
and self-esteem and their recalled stress and self-esteem was due to unreliability of these 
measurements. In future studies, multi-item measures of stress and self-esteem would be 
preferable to help ensure that apparent memory-experience gaps are not inflated by measurement 
error. A related limitation concerns the dynamic factor models used. Because of the need not to 
burden participants excessively, the sampling period was limited to 64 occasions, producing a 
correspondingly limited degree of statistical power for the parameters appearing in these models. 
This raises the possibility that participants may have been more accurate in describing the 
covariance of stress and self-esteem than the current results suggest, especially if they were 
recalling patterns that are generally true of them but did not characterize the comparatively 
limited epoch sampled here. For example, if lagged connections between stress and self-esteem 
were truly present, but weak, our sampling regime may not have recovered them. In addition, 
because dynamic factor models are contingent on the frequency of measurement, participants 
may have recalled dynamics between stress and self-esteem that were accurate but which 
occurred at a speed that was not captured by surveys every 15 minutes. Future research with a 
greater number of occasions and with a higher sampling frequency will be needed to rule out 
these competing explanations. 
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 Another potentially fruitful avenue of research would be to combine experience sampling 
with experimental manipulation of relevant variables, either in a lab setting or in a more 
ecologically relevant time and place. This would allow for specific states to be induced, which 
would enable the exact timing of their onset to be recorded and compared with later recall. 
Future research might also profitably track event-level factors that might impact memory for 
momentary experiences. The current study considered a person-level predictor of memory for 
mental states, as have several prior studies (Barrett, 1997; Ben-Zeev & Young, 2010; Cutler, 
Larsen, & Bunce, 1996; Larsen, 1992; Safer, Levine, & Drapalski, 2002; Suls & Howren, 2012). 
But disentangling person-level influences on memory accuracy from event-level factors that 
influence memory is certainly feasible with ESM and would be of considerable interest.  
 The results of the current series of studies suggest that stress and self-esteem data 
collected using the experience-sampling method is generally more accurate than retrospectively 
reported data at a gap of one week. The extent of this advantage for ESM depends on several 
factors, including whether the retrospective assessment involves recognition or recall, whether 
aggregated or disaggregated information is measured, and (to a limited extent) the individual’s 
level of alexithymia. These results may have implications for research and clinical practice, 
especially for applications in which accurate timing is important and in which dynamics among 
different experiences are a focus of investigation, as this information is particularly difficult for 
individuals to relay with accuracy. Further research will be needed to clarify the boundaries of 
these effects.   
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Table 1 
Spearman’s Rank Correlations among Measures of Recall Inaccuracy in Study 2 
    Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Mdn IQR 
1. Stress mean -     8.32 3.87 - 13.63 
2. Self-esteem mean .205 -    4.49 2.52 - 7.92 
3. Stress time plot .446*** .099 -   330,389 
205,609 – 
462,490 
4. Self-esteem time plot .402** .308** .467*** -  234,741 
141,238 – 
346,571 
5. Dynamic covariation -.025 .002 .021 -.043 - .1507 .088 - .234 
Note. Inaccuracy for means represents the absolute difference between the means of ESM data 
and the recalled means, on a 0-100 scale. Inaccuracy for time plots represents the number of 
pixels between the time plots of ESM data and plots drawn by participants, out of a maximum of 
2,124,690. Inaccuracy for dynamic covariation represents the standardized root mean square 
residual (SRMR) when participant-generated covariance models were fit to their ESM data. 
  
EXPERIENCE SAMPLING AND ACCURACY  33 
 
Table 2 
 
Frequency of Dynamic Covariance Parameters Recalled by Participants and Describing 
Participants’ ESM Data 
Note. N = 75 for recall task and N = 74 for models (one participant’s data could not be modeled). 
  
 Recalled In model 
Parameter 
n % n % 
1. Autoregression: stress predicts later stress 42 56 61 82 
2. Autoregression: SE predicts later SE 31 41 53 72 
3. Cross-lagged regression: Stress predicts later SE 44 59 16 22 
4. Cross-lagged regression: SE predicts later stress 22 29 6 8 
5. Correlation of stress and SE contemporaneously 54 72 57 77 
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Figure 1. Four models of dynamic covariance among stress and self-esteem. Straight lines 
represent regression parameters in which stress and/or self-esteem predict these states 15 minutes 
later, and curved lines represent correlation parameters in which stress and self-esteem covary in 
contemporaneous surveys. 
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Figure 2. Histograms of TAS-20 scores (scale means) for individuals who correctly recognized 
(top) and incorrectly recognized (bottom) their mean stress level and stress time plot from among 
alternatives in Study 1. The red lines represent logistic regression curves predicting correct 
guesses from alexithymia. 
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Figure 3. Time plot drawings for the first eight participants, showing recall of momentary self-
esteem and stress throughout successive 8-hour ESM survey bursts against the actual values. The 
gray area represents the discrepancy in recall. ID numbers at left show the participants whose 
data are represented. Plots for the remaining participants are available at https://osf.io/ympu6. 
